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4o8                   HISTORY OF PERSIA                  CHAP.
defensive, all alliances between Persia and European
nations hostile to Great Britain were made null and void,
and all European armies were to be prevented from enter-
ing Persia, if hostile to Great Britain. The Shah was
furthermore bound to induce the rulers of Khwarazm,
Tataristan, Bokhara, and Samarcand to oppose any army
which might attempt to cross their territories with a view
to the invasion of India. Mutual assistance was to be
rendered in case of aggression, and the limits between
Persia and Russia were to be determined by Great Britain,
Persia, and Russia. With extraordinary generosity the
subsidy was finally fixed at 200,000 tomans (equivalent
to 15 lacs, or 150,000) and was not to be stopped unless
Persia engaged in an aggressive war. It was to be spent
under the superintendence of the British Minister. By
another article endeavours were to be made to include
Persia in any treaty of peace between Great Britain and
a European Power at war with Persia, failing which
military and financial support was to be given. As
regards Afghanistan the British Government was not to
interfere in case of war breaking out between Persia and
the Amir, whereas Persia, on her part, agreed to attack
Afghanistan if it went to war with Great Britain.
It is easy to criticise various details of this treaty, as,
for instance, the clause by which Great Britain was bound
to interfere in boundary disputes between Persia and
Russia; or, again, the supposition that the Shah could
influence the ruler of Tataristan to oppose an invading
army betrayed much ignorance of political geography.
The document, to be judged fairly, must be taken as a
whole. We must bear in mind the keen struggle which
the French had made to win over the Court of Persia,
and the existence of a French peril, even though it loomed
larger in the minds of men than reality justified- We
must also not forget that there had been an Afghan peril.
Taking everything into consideration, we cannot but admit
that the treaty dealt with these important questions in a
statesmanlike and satisfactory manner. The only criticism
which I would venture to make is that it does not appear
to have been recognized that a new power had risen on